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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert P. DeHart ("DeHart"), an 
inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute 
("SCI") at Greene, commenced this civil rights action 
against Martin Horn, Commissioner of the Department of 
Corrections of Pennsylvania, and James Price, 
Superintendent of SCI at Greene (collectively "the prison" or 
"prison officials"), as a result of their failure to provide him 
with a diet consistent with his Buddhist religious beliefs. 
DeHart appeals the final order of the District Court, 
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He 
insists that the defendants' failure to accommodate his 
religious belief, which requires him to follow a vegetarian 
diet, violates both his right to free religious expression 
under the First Amendment and his right to equal 
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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I. 
 
DeHart is currently serving a life sentence at SCI at 
Greene. Since his incarceration, he, with the assistance of 
the City of 10,000 Buddhas, a center of Buddhist teaching, 
has taught himself Buddhism. Based on his own reading of 
the Sutras, which are Buddhist religious texts, DeHart 
became a vegetarian. DeHart testified before the District 
Court that the First Precept in Buddhism prohibits the 
killing of any living thing, and he has interpreted that 
Precept as requiring that he follow a vegetarian diet. The 
prison officials do not challenge the sincerity of DeHart's 
beliefs. They do, however, challenge whether vegetarianism 
is a central tenet of any recognized Buddhist sect. 
 
A brief overview of the process by which Pennsylvania 
prisons provide meals to inmates is necessary for a proper 
understanding of DeHart's request. Pursuant to a master 
menu, all inmates at SCI Greene receive the same meals. 
The food for those meals is obtained through bulk 
purchases. Those inmates whose health requires dietary 
modifications or restrictions receive a therapeutic diet. In 
order for an inmate to receive a therapeutic diet, however, 
it must be prescribed by an institution doctor. The 
therapeutic diet consists of the same foods (in different 
proportions) that are served on the master menu. The 
therapeutic meals are prepared individually, and all 
inmates who have been prescribed a therapeutic diet eat 
together in one dining hall after it has been cleared of the 
other inmates. 
 
DeHart proposes that he be served a vegetarian meal 
when other inmates are served the therapeutic meals. 
DeHart secured the affidavit of a dietician, who averred that 
DeHart's nutritional needs could be satisfied by doubling 
the portions of vegetables and grains already served and 
then adding an eight-ounce cup of a soy-based milk 
product at each meal.1 The cost of this supplement, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the affidavit of DeHart's dietician notes, his proposed diet does 
not 
meet the Recommended Daily Allowance ("RDA") standards for Vitamin 
D, riboflavin, B-6, and zinc as set forth by the National Academy of 
Sciences and adopted by the American Correctional Association. As she 
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is not currently purchased by the Department of 
Corrections ("DOC"), would be $1.71 per day.2 
 
On June 17, 1995, DeHart submitted a written grievance, 
requesting a diet that comports with his religious beliefs. 
That grievance was denied, and DeHart appealed the denial 
to Superintendent Price, who concurred in the result. The 
denial was again upheld on appeal by the DOC Central 
Office Review Committee. DeHart then filed this suit 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
A preliminary injunction hearing was held before a 
Magistrate Judge, who found that vegetarianism is not 
mandated by Buddhism and, for that reason, recommended 
that DeHart be denied preliminary relief. The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. DeHart 
then appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the denial of 
preliminary injunctive relief. See DeHart v. Horn, No. 97- 
3048 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997) (hereinafter "Memorandum 
Opinion"). In the Memorandum Opinion affirming the 
District Court's decision, this Court admonished the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
explained, it did provide more than two-thirds of the RDA standard in 
each instance, and these deficiencies did not cause her to qualify her 
opinion that the proposed diet was sufficient to meet DeHart's 
nutritional needs. The District Court made no findings regarding the 
significance, if any, of these deficiencies. The Pennsylvania DOC Food 
Services Administrative Directive requires that, for the master menu, a 
registered dietician verify that the diet "meets or exceeds the dietary 
allowances as stated in the [RDAs] . . . ." App. 652. For the therapeutic 
diets, however, the regulation merely requires that the diet "be designed 
and certified by a Registered Dietician as being nutritionally correct." 
App. 656. The regulation also provides that it "should be interpreted to 
have sufficient flexibility so as to be consistent with law . . . ." App. 
657. 
On remand, the District Court may find it necessary to determine how 
this Administrative Directive should be interpreted in a context like 
this. 
If it should determine that the proposed diet is inconsistent with the 
Administrative Directive, however, the issue would remain whether 
under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), the prison rules and 
regulations as a whole, as applied to this case, are reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests. 
 
2. The dietician indicated that a day's supply of soy-based milk product 
would cost $1.71 if purchased in a supermarket and would cost less if 
purchased directly from a distributor. 
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District Court not to interject itself into Buddhist doctrinal 
disputes: "We agree with [DeHart] that the district court 
could properly determine only whether he sincerely held his 
religious beliefs, not whether his beliefs are doctrinally 
correct or central to a particular school of Buddhist 
teaching." Memorandum Opinion at 2 (citing Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990)). 
 
On remand, the parties engaged in additional discovery, 
and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The 
Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be 
granted in favor of the prison officials. DeHartfiled 
objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and 
Recommendation, arguing, inter alia, that the Magistrate 
Judge ignored this Court's instructions and again based his 
opinion on a finding that vegetarianism is not a central 
tenet of the Buddhist religion. The District Court adopted 
the Report and Recommendation over that objection, and 
this appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and this Court has 
jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
decision to grant summary judgment. See Wicker v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In our review, we must view all evidence and draw all 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. See Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696. 
 
III. 
 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. 
amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, 
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applicable to the states. Although DeHart is incarcerated, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that "convicted 
prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by 
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). "Inmates clearly 
retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . 
including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free 
exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 
(1987) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the fact of 
incarceration and the valid penological objectives of 
deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and 
institutional security require certain limitations on the 
exercise of constitutional rights by inmates. See Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). 
 
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), the Supreme 
Court articulated the standard for reviewing a prison 
regulation challenged on constitutional grounds: "[W]hen a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests." This test is intended to 
effect an accommodation between two well-established 
principles. "The first of these principles is that federal 
courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional 
claims of prison inmates." Id. at 84. The"second . . . is the 
recognition that `courts are ill equipped to deal with the 
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration' and 
[that] separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of 
judicial restraint." Id. at 84-85 (quoting Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)). Thus, while this 
standard of review requires a court to respect the security, 
rehabilitation and administrative concerns underlying a 
prison regulation, without requiring proof that the 
regulation is the least restrictive means of addressing those 
concerns, it also requires a court to give weight, in 
assessing the overall reasonableness of regulations, to the 
inmate's interest in engaging in constitutionally protected 
activity. 
 
Turner goes on to provide guidance on how to apply its 
reasonableness standard. As we recently explained in 
Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal citations omitted): 
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       [Turner] directs courts to assess the overall 
       reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four 
       factors. "First, there must be a `valid, rational 
       connection' between the prison regulation and the 
       legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 
       it," and this connection must not be "so remote as to 
       render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Second, a 
       court must consider whether inmates retain alternative 
       means of exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a 
       court must take into account the costs that 
       accommodating the right would impose on other 
       inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. And 
       fourth, a court must consider whether there are 
       alternatives to the regulation that "fully accommodate[ ] 
       the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid 
       penological interests." 
 
1. Rational Connection to Penological Interests 
 
The prison asserts that two penological interests are 
served by denying DeHart's request for a vegetarian diet: (1) 
the interest in a simplified and efficient food service; and (2) 
the interest in avoiding possible resentment and jealousy 
on the part of other inmates. The District Court found that 
the denial of DeHart's religious diet was rationally related to 
those two legitimate, penological goals. Given the deference 
we must show to the reasoned judgment of prison officials 
and our recent decision in Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 
(3d Cir. 1998), we agree. 
 
In Johnson, two Pennsylvania prison inmates sued prison 
officials, alleging a violation of their free exercise rights. The 
inmates were Jewish and were seeking a kosher diet in 
conformity with their religious beliefs. In that case, 
however, the prison officials conceded that the inmates 
were entitled to receive a kosher diet; the only issue was 
whether that diet had to consist of hot or cold meals. See 
id. at 281. This Court, thus, never addressed the 
fundamental issue in this case -- i.e., whether the prison is 
constitutionally required to serve a diet that conforms with 
DeHart's religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the Court's analysis 
is helpful here. 
 
In Johnson, the Court specifically held that "[t]he Prison 
has a legitimate penological interest in keeping its food 
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service system as simple as possible." Id. at 282; see also 
Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); 
Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(same). We further observed that the inmates' "request for 
a [religious diet] creates legitimate security concerns, 
including bringing additional foods from new sources into 
the Prison and the possible belief by other inmates that 
[plaintiffs] are receiving special treatment." Johnson, 150 
F.3d at 282. 
 
Johnson, thus, forecloses any argument as to the 
legitimacy of a prison's interest in an efficient food system 
or in avoiding inmate jealousy; those interests are 
legitimate penological concerns under Turner. Moreover, we 
agree that the prison's refusal to grant DeHart's request for 
a religious diet bears some rational relation to those 
concerns. The fifty-five therapeutic trays prepared at each 
meal complicates the food service regimen of the prison, 
and preparation of additional special meals would add 
incrementally to the burden. Similarly, while the evidence 
indicates that the provision of therapeutic meals has never 
given rise to problems in the past, it is not irrational to 
think that providing DeHart with a vegetarian diet to 
accommodate his religious beliefs might involve some risk 
of inmate jealousy. 
 
This determination commences rather than concludes 
our inquiry for two reasons. First, while a rational nexus 
between a regulation and a legitimate penological interest is 
essential to its validity, see Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, not 
all prison regulations that are rationally related to such an 
interest pass Turner's "overall reasonableness" standard. 
Turner, thus, calls for more than traditional rational basis 
review. As the remaining factors evidence, the Turner 
standard also takes into account the extent of the burden 
imposed by the regulation on an inmate's religious 
expression, as well as the impact that accommodating the 
inmate's constitutional claim would have on the entire 
prison community and its resources. 
 
Second, Turner teaches that the "governmental objective 
must be [both] a legitimate and neutral one." Id. at 90 
(emphasis added). The Court "found it important to inquire 
whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First 
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Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without 
regard to the content of the expression." Id. DeHart brought 
to the District Court's attention the fact that the defendants 
in Johnson had urged a judge and a magistrate judge of the 
same court not to order them to provide kosher meals to 
Jewish inmates because the prison was voluntarily 
providing such a diet. DeHart further pointed out that the 
kosher diet being voluntarily provided consisted of milk, 
uncut fruit and vegetables, and a nutritional supplement, 
and that the cost to the prison for these kosher meals was 
substantially more than the cost of the liquid supplement 
diet he was requesting.3 The defendants comment on these 
facts only in response to DeHart's Equal Protection 
argument. Their sole response is: "In Johnson, the Court 
was presented with kosher laws that are a commandment 
of the Orthodox Jewish faith. . . . Here, vegetarianism while 
an expression of belief, is not a commandment of 
Buddhism." Appellees' Br. at 29. 
 
While the District Court did not comment on the fact that 
the defendants were providing specially prepared kosher 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. DeHart also called to the Court's attention the following observations 
of the District Court during the initial stage of the Johnson case: 
 
       The facts as to which there is no genuine dispute may be 
       summarized as follows: 1) keeping kosher is a religious obligation 
       central to the practice of Orthodox Jews, including plaintiffs; 2) 
       although there are increased dollar costs associated with 
       accommodating a kosher diet, those costs are not significant in 
light 
       of the nature of the diet which plaintiffs testified they could eat 
and 
       remain kosher in accordance with the advice of their religious 
       leaders; 3) there are no realistic grounds for believing that 
       accommodating the plaintiffs' kosher diet will have any impact on 
       the defendants' legitimate goals of maintaining institutional order 
       and safety, and the marginal administrative costs of separating 
       genuine from false claims that a prisoner is an Orthodox Jew who 
       is required to keep kosher, in light of the administrative 
apparatus 
       already in place in the Department of Corrections, is minimal. 
 
       I conclude that there is a constitutional right for these 
plaintiffs as 
       Orthodox Jews to keep kosher as described in the evidentiary record 
       of this case, i.e., to a kosher diet not requiring the 
establishment of 
       a separate kitchen or segregated handling procedures. 
 
App. at 152. 
                                 9 
  
meals with nutritional supplements to the Jewish inmates 
at greater cost, we assume that it must have accepted the 
distinction tendered by the defense. As we explain 
hereafter, the proffered distinction is untenable. If, on 
remand, the District Court can articulate no other reason 
why DeHart and the Jewish inmates are not similarly 
situated, it must enter judgment for DeHart. As we have 
noted, neutrality in the regulation of religious expression is 
a sine qua non of validity under Turner.4 
 
2. Alternative Means of Religious Expression  
 
This factor requires a court to focus on the burden that 
the regulation imposes on an inmate's ability to engage in 
constitutionally protected activity. Turner instructs that 
where " `other avenues' remain available for the exercise of 
the asserted right, . . . courts should be particularly 
conscious of the `measure of judicial deference owed to 
corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the 
regulation.' " Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827). Conversely, where the 
regulation leaves no alternative means of exercising the 
asserted right, the inmate's interest in engaging in the 
prohibited activity is entitled to greater weight in the 
balancing process. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We agree with the dissent that a court must examine whether the 
interest asserted as a justification for the regulation is "unrelated to 
the 
suppression of expression." Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 215 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989)). The 
inquiry cannot stop there, however. As we have pointed out above, 
immediately after setting forth the "neutrality" requirement, the Turner 
Court stressed that it was "important to inquire whether prison 
regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a 
neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." Turner, 
482 U.S. at 90 (emphasis added); see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 420 
(finding regulations facially valid under the Turner standard, but 
remanding "for an examination of the validity of the regulations as 
applied"). The fundamental inquiry under Turner is whether what the 
prison is doing is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, 
and we are confident that the Court did not mean to suggest that such 
a relationship can exist where a prison, without substantial justification 
related to legitimate, penological interests, chooses to accommodate the 
religious dietary needs of Jewish inmates while refusing to accommodate 
an inmate of another faith. 
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In Johnson, we applied this teaching in the context of an 
asserted right to a diet in conformity with one's religious 
beliefs. There we contrasted situations involving alternative 
means of religious expression with situations involving 
religious commandments that the prison regulation 
requires the inmate to violate. We explained: 
 
       [T]he importance of alternative means of religious 
       observance is an irrelevant consideration when the 
       belief at issue is a "religious commandment," rather 
       than a "positive expression of belief." [ Ward v. Walsh, 
       1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993)] (discussing Jewish 
       kosher laws). As the United States Court of Appeals for 
       the Ninth Circuit has stated: "It is one thing to curtail 
       various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative 
       ways of expressing belief may be found. It is another 
       thing to require a believer to defile himself, according 
       to the believer's conscience, by doing something that is 
       completely forbidden by the believer's religion." Id. As 
       in Ward, the Inmates here are "defiling" themselves 
       under the laws of kosher when forced to eat non- 
       kosher foods. By acknowledging this, we do not intend 
       to suggest that all "religious commandments" must be 
       accommodated, whatever their costs to legitimate 
       penological concerns. However, in such situations the 
       centrality of the religious tenet carries greater weight 
       and the existence of alternative means of observance is 
       of no use in the ultimate balancing which Turner  
       commands. 
 
Johnson, 150 F.3d at 282. 
 
The District Court erroneously interpreted the distinction 
we drew in Johnson as calling for an assessment of whether 
vegetarianism was a "central tenet" of Buddhism or some 
recognized sect thereof. In the course of its analysis, the 
Court relied heavily on the testimony of Richard McKinney, 
an expert in the doctrine and practices of Buddhism, at the 
preliminary injunction hearing. Based on that testimony, it 
made the following findings: 
 
       Plaintiff practices Mahayana Buddhism, which is one 
       of three major traditions of Buddhist practice, along 
       with the Hinayana and Vajrayana traditions. . . . He 
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       has obtained information from the City of Ten 
       Thousand Buddhists in this respect. Mr. McKinney 
       spoke to two members of the Board of Directors for the 
       City of Ten Thousand Buddhas immediately prior to 
       the hearing in this matter, and they informed him that 
       vegetarianism is a "branch, not a root of their 
       particular approach to Buddhism."[5] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Mr. McKinney gave the following explanation of the "branch, not root" 
concept: 
 
       Q. What do you mean by that? 
 
       A. By that I mean that it is not a root practice, it is a -- like a 
       branch on a tree, it is a -- a practice that one can engage in. 
They 
       happen to engage in that practice. 
 
       Q. Who are they? 
 
       A. Both the monk and the nun that I was talking about. 
 
       Q. Are they within the City of Ten Thousand Buddhists? 
 
       A. They're part of the organization. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Q. With the experience that you have, do you consider the strict 
       vegetarian practice as it is practiced within the City of Ten 
       Thousand Buddhas to be a high form of practice within Buddhism? 
 
       A. I'm hesitating because the idea of higher or lower practice, in 
       which I just said, is -- the root practices have to do with the 
       precepts. The vegetarianism is not higher, it is just a practice 
which 
       grows out of the precept of not harming. 
 
       Q. Okay. Is vegetarianism mandated by Buddhism? 
 
       A. No. 
 
App. at 104-05. 
 
On cross-examination, Mr. McKinney further testified: 
 
       Q. Do some Buddhists practice vegetarianism as a matter of 
       religious belief or conviction? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. Okay. And, in fact, isn't it the case that the-- that the monks 
       or some people associated with the City of Ten Thousand Buddhas 
       practice vegetarianism? 
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       While supporting plaintiff 's right to pursue Buddhism 
       as plaintiff understands it, Mr. McKinney stated that 
       no one practice is an absolute necessity for Buddhism, 
       and that one should "practice what one is able to 
       practice within the environment and conditions that 
       one can." Mr. McKinney also opined that sutras are 
       guidelines, and that plaintiff is interpreting them"in a 
       very literalistic manner." 
 
       What the court is faced with, then, is a situation where 
       plaintiff may sincerely believe that he would defile 
       himself by not following the strict vegetarian diet he 
       has described. His belief, however, is clearly not shared 
       by any other Buddhist identified to the court, and is 
       specifically rejected as a "central" tenet by the very sect 
       of Buddhists to which plaintiff has appealed for 
       guidance in the past. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Since vegetarianism is neither a central part of 
       Buddhism, nor a commandment of that religion, 
       plaintiff 's wish to pursue vegetarianism must be 
       considered an expression of his faith as opposed to his 
       adherence to a religious commandment. This being the 
       case, the existence of alternative means of expression, 
       including prayer and possession of religious texts, 
       makes this factor one which weighs in the prison's 
       favor as well. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. And isn't it the case that at least some of the people in the 
City 
       of Ten Thousand Buddhas perform the custom where they eat one 
       vegetarian meal before noon or early in the day and that's the only 
       meal that they eat? 
 
       A. There are many Teravadan monks who do the same. 
 
       Q. Okay. And that's a function of their religious conviction and 
       religious belief, is that correct? 
 
       A. It's a function of their religious practice. 
 
App. at 106-07. 
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District Court Slip Op. at 16, 17 (internal citations omitted). 
 
The District Court's reliance on the fact that DeHart's 
beliefs are not shared by others in the Buddhist religion is 
inconsistent with both Supreme Court caselaw and the 
precedent of this Court. As the Supreme Court cautioned in 
Employment Division v. Smith: 
 
       "[I]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
       centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or 
       the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of 
       those creeds." Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
       [680,] 699 [(1989)]. Repeatedly and in many different 
       contexts, we have warned that courts must not 
       presume to determine the place of a particular belief in 
       a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim. 
 
494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (plurality opinion). Although 
the Court was divided in Smith, the concurring and 
dissenting opinions both expressly agreed with the 
majority's admonition. See id. at 906 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("I agree with the Court . . . [that] `[i]t is not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliefs or practices to a faith.' ") (quoting 
Hernandez); id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I agree 
. . . that courts should refrain from delving into questions 
whether, as a matter of religious doctrine, a particular 
practice is `central' to the religion"). 
 
Smith is not an aberration. Rather, it is part of a 
consistent and resounding theme echoed throughout many 
Supreme Court opinions. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 
(1981) ("[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to 
beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious 
sect. . . . [I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial 
competence to inquire [who has] more correctly perceived 
the commands of their common faith."); Jones v. Wolf, 443 
U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 450 (1969) ("the First Amendment forbids . . . 
courts from . . . assessing the relative significance to the 
religion of the tenets"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 
78, 85-87 (1944). 
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The course to be followed in a case of this kind was 
charted by this Court in Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 
1025 (3d Cir. 1981), which also involved an inmate's 
request for a special diet said to be mandated by the Free 
Exercise Clause. The inmate was a member of MOVE, " `a 
revolutionary' organization, `absolutely opposed to all that 
is wrong.' " Id. at 1026. We there posed the issues for 
decision as follows: 
 
       The relevant case law in the free exercise area suggests 
       that two threshold requirements must be met before 
       particular beliefs, alleged to be religious in nature, are 
       accorded first amendment protection. A court's task is 
       to decide whether the beliefs avowed are (1) sincerely 
       held, and (2) religious in nature, in the claimant's 
       scheme of things. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
       163, 185, 85 S. Ct. 850, 863, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965); 
       Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 
       1981). If either of these two requirements is not 
       satisfied, the court need not reach the question, often 
       quite difficult in the penological setting, whether a 
       legitimate and reasonably exercised state interest 
       outweighs the proffered first amendment claim. 
 
Africa, 662 F.2d at 1029-30. It was clear that Africa's 
beliefs were sincerely held. We concluded, however, that 
those beliefs were not "religious in nature" and, 
accordingly, we had no occasion to reach the issue of 
whether the state's legitimate interest outweighed the 
proffered free exercise claim. 
 
When we explained the necessity of finding a sincerely 
held belief, we were careful in Africa to stress that the case 
law did not require a finding of an orthodox belief: 
 
       Judges are not oracles of theological verity, and the 
       Founders did not intend for them to be declarants of 
       religious orthodoxy. See United States v. Ballard, 322 
       U.S. 78, 85-88, 64 S. Ct. 882, 885-87, 88 L.Ed. 1148 
       (1944). The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, 
       that "while the `truth' of a belief is not open to 
       question, there remains the significant question 
       whether it is `truly held.' " Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at 
       185, 85 S. Ct. at 863. Without some sort of required 
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       showing of sincerity on the part of the individual or 
       organization seeking judicial protection of its beliefs, 
       the first amendment would become "a limitless excuse 
       for avoiding all unwanted legal obligations." 
 
Id. at 1030 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
We reiterated the same theme in the course of explaining 
the necessity of a finding that Africa's sincerely held beliefs 
were religious in nature: 
 
       As was observed earlier, the judicial branch is neither 
       authorized nor equipped to pronounce upon the veracity 
       of a religious precept. Unless, however, every 
       individual's subjective definition of a religion is to be 
       controlling in first amendment litigation, "a court must, 
       at least to a degree, examine the content of the 
       supposed religion, not to determine its truth or falsity, 
       or whether it is schismatic or orthodox, but to determine 
       whether the subject matter it comprehends is 
       consistent with the assertion that it is, or is not, a 
       religion." Malnak, supra, 592 F.2d at 208 (concurring 
       opinion). 
 
Id. at 1034 n.18 (emphasis added). 
 
While Africa was decided before Turner, there is nothing 
in Turner, subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence, or the 
jurisprudence of our circuit that is inconsistent with the 
holding in Africa. Even unorthodox beliefs are afforded 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, so long as they are sincerely held and 
religious in nature. In the present case, the defendants 
conceded that DeHart's beliefs are sincerely held and 
religious in nature. It necessarily follows that DeHart's 
beliefs were constitutionally protected. It also necessarily 
follows that the District Court erred by according them less 
weight because they were not shared or considered 
essential by others in the Buddhist religion.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. By so concluding, we do not mean to suggest that evidence of the 
tenets of established religions is irrelevant in a context like this. 
Quite 
the contrary, such evidence may bear on the determination of whether 
a person's beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are religious in 
nature. 
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Having established that DeHart's beliefs are entitled to 
constitutional protection and that the prison is restricting 
his ability to practice his religion in accordance with those 
beliefs, the second prong of Turner requires us to examine 
whether DeHart has alternative means of exercising the 
circumscribed right. As this Court and others have noted, 
whether an alternative means of expression remains 
available depends on how the relevant First Amendment 
right is defined. See Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 
218 (3d Cir. 1999); Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
instructed that " `the right' in question must be viewed 
sensibly and expansively." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401, 417 (1989) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92). In Turner, 
the challenged prison regulation prohibited correspondence 
between an inmate and inmates at other institutions. The 
Court, in applying the second factor, did not inquire 
whether inmates had alternative means of communicating 
with inmates at other institutions. Rather, it concluded that 
because the regulation barred "communications only within 
a limited class of other people," it did not deprive prisoners 
of alternative means of expression. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92. 
Similarly, in Thornburgh, where the challenged regulation 
prevented inmates from receiving sexually explicit material 
that posed a threat to security, the Court found that 
alternative means of expression were available because the 
regulations permitted "a broad range of publications to be 
sent, received, and read." Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. 
 
The distinction in Johnson on which the District Court 
seized simply recognizes that courts must consider the 
nature of the right for which the inmate seeks 
accommodation -- i.e., whether, in the context of the 
inmate's belief system, it is a "religious commandment" or 
a "positive expression of belief" -- in order sensibly to 
define the relevant right. Thus, if failure to accommodate 
an inmate's request forces that inmate to do something that 
is proscribed by his or her religion, as he or she 
understands it, we must recognize that there are no 
alternative means by which he or she may engage in the 
relevant religious practice. See Johnson, 150 F.3d at 282 (in 
such cases "the importance of alternative means of religious 
observance is an irrelevant consideration"). The present 
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case provides a perfect example -- by denying DeHart's 
request for a vegetarian diet, the prison officials forced him 
to do something forbidden by his religious beliefs. There are 
simply no alternative means by which DeHart can maintain 
a diet in conformity with his religious beliefs; he is either 
provided a vegetarian diet, or he is not. 
 
In contrast, where a prison regulation merely limits a 
form of positive expression of one's religious faith and 
beliefs -- as, for example, prayer, worship, meditation, 
scripture study, etc. -- the second Turner factor requires 
consideration of the alternative means of expression that 
are left open.7 If, as in O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987), Muslim inmates are prohibited from attending 
Jumu'ah, a congregate service held only on Friday 
afternoons, do they have other opportunities for congregate 
worship at other times? To the extent alternative avenues of 
expression are open, Johnson dictates that the weight 
accorded the inmate's interest in the prohibited form of 
expression is entitled to less weight. 
 
Following our reasoning in Johnson, we find that no 
alternative means of expression exist for DeHart, because 
by failing to provide him with a vegetarian diet, the prison 
officials have forced DeHart "to defile himself, according to 
[his own] conscience, by doing something that is completely 
forbidden by [his] religion." Johnson, 150 F.3d at 282 
(quoting Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
As we stressed in Johnson, however, the absence of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We, thus, agree with the dissent that "Johnson makes clear that the 
centrality of a religious practice . . . is a valid consideration in 
applying 
the Turner test." The issue for decision here, however, is whether the 
Court in determining the "centrality" of a particular belief must look to 
the sincerely held religious beliefs of the inmate involved or to the 
"orthodox" beliefs of others. As we have explained, we read Smith and 
Africa together as requiring that courts not"pronounce on the veracity 
of a religious precept." Africa, 662 F.2d at 1034 n.18. Provided that the 
relevant precept is sincerely held and religious in nature, we must afford 
it constitutional protection. Thus, in this case, because the prison has 
conceded that DeHart's belief -- i.e., that his religion requires him to 
follow a specific diet -- is sincerely held and religious in nature, that 
belief is entitled to the full measure of constitution protection, whether 
or not it is shared by others in the Buddhist religion. 
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alternatives for DeHart does not necessarily mean that his 
interest in a vegetarian diet must be accommodated. 
Nevertheless, it does mean that that interest is entitled to 
substantially more weight in the "overall reasonableness" 
analysis than it would be if there were adequate substitute 
means of expression. 
 
We recognize that our holding conflicts with the recent 
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Spies v. 
Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999). The facts in that 
case were similar to those here: a prisoner desired a strict 
vegan meal -- i.e., absolutely no food stuffs derived from 
animals -- in conformity with his Buddhist religious beliefs. 
In Spies, however, the prisoner conceded that, while a 
vegetarian diet was required by Buddhism, a vegan diet 
was not. The prison had provided the prisoner with a 
vegetarian diet, but it refused to provide a vegan diet. The 
prisoner brought suit, alleging infringement of his free 
exercise rights. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that, although Spies's vegan beliefs were sincerely held 
religious beliefs, because they were not required by 
Buddhism, the prison could continue to provide a 
vegetarian meal, thereby granting Spies an "alternative 
means" of exercising his religion. See id. at 407. We, 
respectfully, disagree with the Spies analysis. 
 
Under the First Amendment, citizens are not limited to 
practicing an organized religion. Whether other Buddhists 
agree with DeHart's beliefs is simply not relevant to the 
Turner analysis. The analysis conducted by the District 
Court presupposes that a person is limited to practicing a 
religion according to a specific prescription and that only 
those customs, which others recognize as required, will be 
unassailable. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 
(1944) ("[Man] was granted the right to worship as he 
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his 
religious views."). To us, that seems contrary to the very 
point of the First Amendment, which was designed to 
protect the free exercise of any religion, whether it be 
organized, accepted, or not. See Spies v. Voinovich, 173 
F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 1999) (Moore, J., dissenting) ("the 
First Amendment does not provide greater protection for 
centralized religions with established sets of mandatory 
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doctrines than it provides for less established or individual- 
based religions"). 
 
3. Remaining Factors and the Weighing Process  
 
The first two Turner factors focus on the prison's decision 
-- to what extent is it justified by legitimate and neutral 
concerns and what options does it leave open to the inmate. 
The third and fourth factors, on the other hand, focus on 
the specific religious practice or expression in which the 
inmate wishes to engage -- what will be the consequences 
of accommodating the inmate for guards, other inmates, 
and the allocation of prison resources. 
 
As we have previously noted, DeHart desires a meal, 
served along with the therapeutic meals, consisting of an 
eight-ounce cup of soy milk and increased portions of the 
non-meat and non-dairy items from the master menu. The 
soy milk supplement is the only item DeHart requests that 
is not currently purchased by the DOC. The District Court 
found that the prison could provide DeHart a cup of the soy 
milk at each meal for a total cost of $1.71 per day. 
 
The District Court's analysis of the third Turner factor 
was as follows: 
 
       The third factor in the Turner test is the impact which 
       providing plaintiff a strict vegetarian diet would have 
       on the institution, guards and other inmates. There is 
       no undisputed evidence concerning the impact this 
       factor has, and it is neutral for purposes of the motion 
       for summary judgment. 
 
District Court Slip Op. at 17. With respect to the fourth 
factor, the District Court concluded that "the cost factor 
favors the prison, while the fact that an available 
alternative exists favors plaintiff 's position. This factor is 
also neutral." District Court Slip Op. at 18. 
 
The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment 
against DeHart on the following ground: 
 
       Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 
       plaintiff, two of the four Turner factors weigh in favor of 
       defendants, while the final two factors are neutral. 
       Thus, the court concludes that application of the 
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       Turner balancing test results in the conclusion that the 
       First Amendment does not require Prison Officials to 
       provide plaintiff a vegetarian diet. 
 
District Court Slip Op. at 18. 
 
The District Court's analysis of the third factor is 
unacceptable. It is true that there is "no undisputed 
evidence" regarding the impact that accommodating DeHart 
would have on the prison community. DeHart's evidence 
regarding the service of therapeutic and kosher meals and 
what it would take to meet his religious requirements would 
support an inference that any impact would be minimal. 
On the other hand, the defendants have tendered evidence 
tending to show that, if DeHart is accommodated, others 
will demand similar treatment. But the fact that there is no 
undisputed evidence is not a reason for concluding that the 
third factor is neutral. If there is conflicting evidence, the 
conflict needs to be resolved and findings made about the 
size and quality of the impact on the prison community. 
Without such findings, it is not possible for the District 
Court to engage in the sensitive weighing process that 
Turner envisions. 
 
This brings us to a final fundamental problem with the 
District Court's analysis. Turner does not call for placing 
each factor in one of two columns and tallying a numerical 
result. The objective is to determine whether the regulation 
is reasonable given the defendants' penological concerns 
and the inmate's interest in engaging in the constitutionally 
protected activity. Turner thus contemplates a weighing 
process, and various factors necessarily will be entitled to 
different weights depending on the circumstances. We have 
already spoken about how the weight to be given to the 
second factor will vary depending on the availability of 
alternatives. The same is true of the first factor; direct 
threats to the security of the institution will justify 
infringements on First Amendment rights that speculative 
efficiency concerns will not. Accordingly, the Court, while 
giving due deference to the expertise of prison officials, 
must take into account the character of the legitimate 
penological interest advanced and the degree to which that 
interest will be served by the challenged regulation. 
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IV. 
 
Finally, DeHart asserts an equal protection claim, 
arguing that he is similarly situated to the Jewish inmates 
in Johnson whose dietary restrictions were accommodated 
by the defendants. As with his First Amendment claim, 
DeHart's equal protection claim must be analyzed under 
the Turner framework. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 ("[W]hen 
a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests."). Thus, in order to recover, 
DeHart "must prove that the distinction between himself 
and the other inmates was not reasonably related to some 
legitimate penological purpose." Clark v. Groose, 36 F.3d 
770, 773 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
As we noted earlier, the District Court did not comment 
on the fact that the defendants are currently providing 
specially prepared kosher diets to Jewish inmates at greater 
cost. We have already rejected defendants' argument that 
DeHart may be treated differently because his diet is not 
required by Buddhism generally. Thus, as with the First 
Amendment claim, if DeHart can demonstrate that no 
legitimate penological purpose is served by treating him 
differently from the inmates in Johnson, he must prevail on 
his equal protection claim. Due to the absence offindings 
as to whether the prison's decision to treat DeHart 
differently from Jewish inmates is "reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests," Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 
however, we will remand this issue to the District Court. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that this case should be 
remanded for further factual assessment of the factors set 
forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). I also 
agree with the majority's admonition that those factors are 
to be balanced, not tallied. I write separately because I 
respectfully disagree with the majority's position as to 
whether an analysis of an inmate's "alternative means of 
religious expression" under Turner properly may include an 
assessment of the centrality of the religious tenet on which 
an inmate's requested accommodation is based. 
 
Turner requires us to uphold a prison's regulation if it is 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Once 
a prison establishes a legitimate interest, the four Turner 
factors gauge the regulation's overall reasonableness. I 
agree that the defendants here established the necessary 
legitimate penological interest, and established that the 
prison's special diet regulation is rationally related to that 
interest (the first Turner factor). I disagree with the 
majority's analysis of the remaining Turner factors. 
 
The second Turner factor assesses the existence of 
alternative means by which an inmate can practice his 
religion, not whether there are alternatives to the specific 
activity at issue.1 O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 
(1987). Here, the District Court concluded that DeHart had 
many alternative ways to exercise his right -- meditation, 
prayer, or reading religious texts -- all of which the prison 
allowed. The District Court based its analysis of this factor 
on a determination that vegetarianism is not a 
"commandment" of Buddhism (even of the particular sect to 
which DeHart belongs), but is merely a positive expression 
of DeHart's faith. The majority rejects this analysis, stating 
that the court erred in making any assessment at all about 
the central tenet issue, because under Employment Div., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For this reason, I believe the majority's conclusion that "[t]here are 
simply no alternative means by which DeHart can maintain a diet in 
conformity with his religious beliefs" is based on too narrow a 
characterization of the "right" at issue. 
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Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
such inquiry is forbidden. 
 
I do not believe that Smith forbids inquiry into the central 
tenet issue when assessing Turner's second factor. Smith 
addressed whether a criminal law banning peyote use was 
unconstitutional where the use was religious. Holding that 
it was not, the Court rejected application of a"compelling 
interest" test, stating that it would be improper for judges 
to assess the centrality of religious beliefs in assessing 
whether to apply a compelling interest test. Id. at 886. The 
Court did not indicate that the centrality issue should 
never be considered, and did not address the centrality 
issue in the context of assessing a challenged prison 
regulation.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For the same reason, I do not believe that Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 
F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) concludes our inquiry here. The key issue there 
was whether Africa's purported religion ("MOVE") was in fact a religion. 
We held that it was not. As the majority acknowledges, Africa did not 
reach the issue that DeHart presents: whether the state's penological 
interests outweigh an inmate's free exercise claim. In this case, the 
parties do not dispute that DeHart's beliefs are religious in nature, or 
sincerely held. (Interestingly, the record shows that only after DeHart 
filed several grievances objecting to a diet that included vegetables 
cooked in butter did he raise the issue of his religious practices.) Nor 
are 
the parties (or the court) attempting to assess the truth or falsity of 
DeHart's beliefs. Instead, as Turner requires, we assess the central tenet 
issue to determine whether DeHart has alternative ways to exercise his 
First Amendment rights. Similarly, in Africa we expressly acknowledged 
that a court must examine the content of an asserted religion (at least 
to a degree) in order to determine whether it is, in fact, a religion. 
Africa, 
662 F.2d at 1034 n.18. In short, to interpret Africa to preclude any 
objective evidence on the centrality issue would eviscerate Turner's 
second prong. On this point, I note that in Johnson we analyzed the 
issue in terms of the requirements of the kosher laws, and not merely 
the inmates' subjective interpretations of those laws. Similarly, the 
court 
in Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993) (a case we quoted in 
Johnson) stated that on remand the district court could consider the 
inmate's "challenge to the orthodoxy of the rabbi who testified on behalf 
of the state." Clearly, the inquiry does not end with the inmate's claims; 
the defendant is entitled to put on evidence of the centrality of the 
practice at issue, and the district court is entitled to weigh that 
evidence 
against the inmate's testimony. 
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Turner, however, did address the issue of assessing a 
challenged prison regulation, noting expressly the deference 
to be accorded to prison officials' decisions, and the 
separation of powers concerns that counsel a policy of 
judicial restraint. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85. Turner 
requires courts to consider whether an inmate has 
alternative means of exercising his right to religious 
freedom. That question cannot be answered withoutfirst 
determining the centrality of the practice or belief at issue; 
that is, whether or not it is commanded by the inmate's 
religion. As we held in Johnson -- in the specific context of 
evaluating the second Turner factor --"the importance of 
alternative means of religious observance is an irrelevant 
consideration when the belief at issue is a `religious 
commandment' rather than a positive expression of belief." 
Johnson, 150 F.3d at 282. The Jewish inmates in Johnson 
would have been " `defiling' themselves under the laws of 
kosher when forced to eat non-kosher foods . . . In such 
situations, the centrality of the religious tenet carries 
greater weight and the existence of alternative means of 
observance is of no use in the ultimate balance which 
Turner commands." Id. at 282. 
 
It seems to me that our holding in Johnson makes clear 
that the centrality of a religious practice -- in particular, 
whether it is a commandment of the religion or a positive 
expression of belief -- is a valid consideration in applying 
the Turner test. If the practice is a commandment (as is 
keeping kosher for certain Jewish inmates), then alternative 
means of expression are irrelevant, and the second Turner 
factor will weigh in an inmate's favor. But if the practice is 
a positive expression of belief and the inmate has 
alternative means of expression, then the factor may weigh 
in the defendant's favor, depending on the facts. 
 
Here, the evidence established that vegetarianism (or, by 
extension, the more restrictive veganism that DeHart 
wishes to practice) is not a commandment of either 
Buddhism in general or of the particular branch of 
Buddhism that DeHart practices. This is shown by the 
testimony of the defendants' expert witness, and by the 
written correspondence between DeHart and his spiritual 
mentors, members of The City of Ten Thousand Buddhas. 
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In response to DeHart's query about vegetarianism, The 
City of Ten Thousand Buddhas advised him that although 
vegetarianism is preferred, it was not mandated in his 
situation: "Clearly you are not in an ideal situation for 
doing so. The Buddha, in giving us the Precepts, 
consistently provided minor acceptions [sic] in cases where 
it would be impossible to hold them to the finest detail . . . 
[I]t would seem enough that you are sincere in your wish to 
maintain the Buddha's precepts and that you try your very 
best to follow the Buddha's instructions as closely as 
possible, while practicing patience with our states and with 
your environment." Thus, even the particular Buddhist 
temple to which DeHart belongs does not believe that 
DeHart's vegetarianism is a required practice, and does not 
view his failure to keep the diet as a defiling offense. For 
this reason, the situation of the Jewish inmates in Johnson 
properly is distinguished from that of DeHart. In this 
regard, I respectfully disagree with the majority's contrary 
position (and instructions regarding entry of judgment on 
remand).3 
 
As to the third and fourth Turner factors-- the impact on 
the prison of accommodating DeHart's request for special 
meals, and whether there are easy alternatives by which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority instructs the District Court to enter judgment for DeHart 
unless it can distinguish this case from Johnson on grounds other than 
the central tenet issue. The majority's instruction is based on its 
interpretation of Turner's requirement that in order for a regulation to 
be 
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest, the regulation 
must 
be neutral. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. I do not believe Turner's 
neutrality 
requirement supports the majority's directive, for it asks whether the 
challenged regulation operates in a neutral way, without regard to the 
content of expression. Id. at 90. Moreover, we have previously explained 
that Turner's neutrality requirement is met if the prison's asserted 
interest giving rise to the regulation is unrelated to suppressing 
expression. See Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989)). We held in 
Waterman that New Jersey's interest in rehabilitating sex offenders was 
not related to the suppression of expression, and the challenged 
regulation therefore was neutral. Id. So, too, the prison's interest here 
in 
an efficient food service system is not related to the suppression of 
religious expression. Accordingly, its special diet regulation is neutral 
for 
purposes of the Turner analysis. 
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DeHart can be accommodated at de minimus cost -- I agree 
that further fact-finding is necessary. But unlike the 
majority, I believe that on remand the court first must 
clarify the nature of DeHart's requested accommodation. 
DeHart frames the issue as a request for a vegetarian diet. 
Vegetarian diets typically avoid meat, fish, and poultry. 
DeHart's proposed diet is more restrictive. Not only must it 
be free of meat, fish, and poultry, but also free of eggs, 
dairy products, pungent root materials such as onions or 
garlic, and any material derived from any animal product. 
In this respect, DeHart's requested diet4  is even more 
restrictive than a vegan diet (one disallowing all animal 
products) because it also would prohibit any non-animal 
food or material that is prepared with animal products (for 
example, vitamin supplements that may include bone 
derivatives or bread made with animal byproduct 
preservatives, both of which DeHart has declined). On this 
point, it bears noting that the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 
1999) (which the majority distinguishes) held that a prison 
was not constitutionally required to provide a Buddhist 
inmate with a vegan diet. In sum, a clear understanding of 
the precise nature and parameters of the special diet that 
DeHart seeks (for example, whether the diet prohibit fruits 
and vegetables that have been fertilized with organic 
material) is essential to a proper assessment of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority apparently believes that DeHart can be accommodated 
with extra portions of vegetables and bread, and with a cup of specially- 
purchased soy milk with each meal. But, as noted supra, the record 
contains conflicting evidence as to the precise nature of the diet that 
DeHart seeks (including a "beans and rice" diet that DeHart suggested at 
the preliminary injunction hearing). Moreover, DeHart has not rebutted 
the testimony of the defendants' expert that the"extra portions plus soy 
milk" diet fails to meet the relevant regulatory nutritional requirements 
for inmates, is based on an out-of-date master prison menu (and is 
therefore not accurate with respect to food items that the prison has 
available), and cannot fully be evaluated because it proposes only a five- 
day menu, compared to the prison's forty-two day menu cycle. Unless 
DeHart addresses these issues on remand, his proposed diet does not 
appear to be a viable one. 
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resulting burden on the prison in complying with his 
request, and the overall balancing of the Turner factors.5 
 
In assessing the burden on the prison of accommodating 
DeHart's request, I believe the majority fails to take 
sufficient account of the evidence of the potential for "ripple 
effect" within the prison. The Supreme Court has 
encouraged courts to give "particular deference" to the 
informed discretion of corrections officials on this issue. 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
 
Finally, with respect to DeHart's equal protection claim 
that he is being treated differently from Jewish inmates 
who request and receive kosher meals, I do not believe that 
DeHart has stated a valid claim. In order to do so, he must 
come forward with some evidence of discriminatory intent 
on the part of the defendants. DeHart has not done so. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment 
on this issue. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The majority's point as to the need for a bona fide balancing of the 
factors is well-taken. But we have noted that in the course of conducting 
that balancing, the first Turner factor "looms especially large." 
Waterman, 
183 F.3d at 208. 
 
                                28 
 
